Yelling, Not Telling: An Antitherapeutic Approach
Promoting Conflict
Luis Muffiz Arguielles*
[R]eligious practice does not create a separate region where the
Government is barred from enforcing the laws. Otherwise,
under the cloak of religious immunity and with the unrestricted
constitutional freedom to worship the Creator in and out of
acknowledged churches, practices which because they are generally disapproved are defined as crimes with punitive sanction in
the penal law, could be developed.... [T]he freedom of worship
written in the Constitution ... is not a license to create a
separate, untouchable, and autocratic world capable of impunitively offsetting the sensitive equilibrium of the harmonious
entity which is the political society.... Religious freedom is not
an ointment of immunity which relieves those professing it from
observing and respecting the laws under which society has been
organized, and which gather in their provisions the principles of
peace, morals and public order... The constitutional protection shelters the freedom of thought but not the liberty of
torture.'
Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico, 1979-present; Superior Court Judge,
Puerto Rico, 1989-1992; Doctorat de I'Universit de Paris II, 1989; J.D. University of Puerto
Rico, 1975; M.S. Columbia University, 1970; B.A. Cornell University, 1968.
1. Heirs of Victoria Capella v. Iglesia Pentecostal, 102 D.P.R. 20, 30, 36, 38 (1974)
(citations omitted). Quotations are taken from the Offwial Translations of the Opinions of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Vol. 2. Although a part of the United States since its conquest by
Spain in 1898, Puerto Rico is a Spanish speaking jurisdiction. Officially, it is bilingual, but most
proceedings are conducted in Spanish, even in federal agencies. State court proceedings are
conducted only in Spanish, a practice that was validated in Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior, 92 P.R.
Dec. 596 (1965). Puerto Rico's judicial decisions follow the United States model because an
American court system replaced the Spanish one after the island was wrested from Spain following the Spanish-American War. Government organization is also patterned after the United
States model, but efforts to change other cultural traits, especially language, have failed. Commercial English translations to court reports ceased to be published in 1973, and although official
translations are made, they fall years behind the court rulings and are normally available only in
the Supreme Court and in some law school libraries. The translations are, at times, awkward,
especially if the original Spanish version is difficult to work with. Given that the translations are
official, however, I have chosen to use them here, clarifying some phrases that might seem
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It is with this language that, on February 21, 1974, a unanimous
Puerto Rico Supreme Court upheld a ruling by the San Juan Superior
Court forcing the defendant, the Pentecostal Church in Old San Juan,
to "isolate the sonority of the temple, [a] solution which would preserve the peace of the neighbors and win acceptance and good will
toward the church." 2 Such a solution, the court said, was necessary:
[B]ecause the observants of the Pentecostal religion do not have
more rights to their dissonances and uproar than their neighbors
to the retreat of the homes. . . [and because] the State cannot
show itself to be insensible to the torture and extreme moral
sufferings of the persons whose privacy has been invalidated by
this practice.'
In a recent article commenting on the Canadian Supreme Court's
ruling on the legality of a unilateral declaration of independence from
Canada on the part of the francophone province of Quebec, Professor
Natalie Des Rosiers praises the justices' efforts to promote dialogue
between adversaries.4 I present here an example of how harsh, if not
outright insulting and prejudiced, judicial language can have the
opposite effect: that of escalating, if not actually producing, conflict
where it did not previously exist.
In this Article, I will first examine the facts of the Pentecostal
Church case, where the above quoted offensive language was used by
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court (I). Later I will illustrate the reaction
this language produced (II). Following this, I will briefly comment on
the benefits and limits of a more conciliatory manner of expression
(III). Finally, I will raise some questions as to whether the therapeutic
jurisprudence movement should venture into conflicts where the
parties are, in effect, testing out their respective political strengths or if
it should concentrate on the more traditional fields that have earned it
a name in legal literature (IV).
I.

THE FACTS OF THE PENTECOSTAL CHURCH CASE

Neighbors of the Pentecostal Church complained that those who
attended services sang and shouted very loudly, clapped their hands,
stomped their feet, and played wind and percussion instruments so
particularly uncommon.
2. Iglesia Pentecostal, 102 D.P.R. at 40-41. The phrase "isolating the sonority of the
temple" is taken from the official translation of the court report. It is a direct translation from
the Spanish original and perhaps would be better understood if it had been translated as "taking
measures to insure sounds generated within the church were not heard outside."
3. Id. at 38-39.
4. Natalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of
Courts in Minority/MajorityConflicts, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 54.
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loudly that some in the vicinity were forced to leave their homes during the time services were held and others permanently moved away.
The noise, they said, was such that many plaintiffs were alarmed,
cried in desperation, and felt anguished. The services were held three
to four times a week, from 7:00 to 10:00 at night, and on Sundays and
holidays during daylight hours.
The court labeled the noise level as one that subjected the neighbors to constant torture and deprived them of what it called the most
basic of civil liberties, the right to live in peace in one's own home.
II. THE TONE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
This language, which the court surprisingly-and perhaps even
sincerely-said was a "call to moderation,"5 provoked one of Puerto
Rico's most monumental public demonstrations,6 paralyzing traffic for
both hours and kilometers on end. The marchers, mainly but not
exclusively churchgoers organized by a council of some Protestant
churches, gathered and were, not surprisingly, warmly welcomed in
front of the Legislative Assembly, which shortly thereafter passed
several bills. One bill amended the little-used penal nuisance statute.
Formerly, the statute could not be used to prevent the tolling of
church bells or to curb religious services. It was amended so as to
prevent the statute from barring "the sounds emitted during worship
or ceremonial services of duly established churches, sects or religious
denominations." 7 A second bill amended article 277 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (the civil nuisance statute), barring its application in
"activities related to the public worship in churches practiced by
different religions." 8 The legislature gave the Environmental Quality
Board "exclusive first instance jurisdiction---civil or criminal" regarding alleged violations of statutes regulating unnecessary noises and
ordered the Board "to take into account the exercise of such constitutional rights as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of
association and the right of privacy" in drafting its rules regulating
sounds.9
5. IglesiaPentecostal, 102 D.P.R. at 40.
6. The author of this comment covered the march as a reporter for The San Juan Star,
Puerto Rico's English language daily. The only other similarly massive marches that he has
witnessed-one some two decades ago to protest the hosting of the American Southern
Governor's Conference, another to protest the Centennial of the American Invasion of Puerto
Rico on July 25, 1898, during the Spanish American War, and a third this past February 21,
2000 to protest the U.S. Navy plans to continue using the off-shore island of Vieques as a firing
range-have all had nationalistic political implications.
7. P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33, § 1447 (1974).
8. P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 32, § 2761 (1974).
9. P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 12, § 1131 (1974).
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The decision by the Court was not, from a legal point of view,
flawed. The relevant interests must be balanced when there are
clashes of constitutionally or legally protected rights. Civil nuisance
statutes have always allowed courts to order parties to take measures to
minimize that which affects others to acceptable levels. "Isolating the
sonority of the temple" is certainly an acceptable means of achieving
the balance the Court was called upon to establish.
What is surprising, and luckily uncommon,"0 is the extremely
harsh language used by the Court, which provoked mass reaction and
led to absurd legislation that has since been largely ignored. The decision itself has, fortunately, also been ignored, hopefully reflecting an
awareness of the fact it was at least badly worded. It has been cited
only twice since it was issued, once in a dissenting opinion" and once
in a majority ruling on a point unrelated to religious ceremonies. 2
Puerto Rico, one of the last two Spanish colonies in the New
World, was officially Catholic for over 400 years, from the arrival of
Christopher Columbus in 1493 to its conquest by the United States in
the Spanish American War of 1898. Catholicism is the majority religion and, although there is a growth of Protestantism, "duly [and not
so duly] established churches" (if such characterization, which was
used by the Court, is permissible)" remain a minority and thus,
unsurprisingly, are more militant than the majority Catholics. This
also means that they are more sensitive to hostile language and more
willing to demand respect for their rights.
It is this perspective that an insensitive Court ignored when it
lashed out against that minority, apparently thinking the majority
would support the ruling, as it well could have. The issue, however, is
that a court should not use the street language one commonly associates with irate litigants when issuing its decisions. In a pluralistic
society, minority rights have to be respected and should be considered
beyond the actual rulings. Minorities, especially significant minorities, do not just fade away in silence when threatened. They tend to
10. See, for example, Professor Roberto Aponte Toro's comment on another Puerto Rico
Supreme Court decision in another highly controversial case involving political persecution,
specifically barred by the Puerto Rican Constitution. Roberto Aponte Toro, Norriega v.
Hernandez Col6n: PoliticalPersecution Under Therapeutic Scrutiny, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 555
(2000).
11. Ramos Villanueva v. Cintr6n, 112 P.R. Dec. 514 (1982).
12. Mercado Rivera v. Universidad Cat6lica, 143 P.R. Dec. 48 (issued June 27, 1997).
This case is still unpublished in hard copy, but it is available on the Lexis CD-Rom of Puerto
Rico Supreme Court Decisions.
13. The Court, I believe, used the phrase "duly established churches" to distinguish those
that were mainstream or traditional from new churches, which were, at the time, a new social
phenomenon in Puerto Rico, if not in Latin America in general.
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fight back, which at times leads to renewed conflict, lasting ill feeling,
and a backlash from the majority. Shouting is not always, if it is ever,
the best way to achieve consensus.
Professor Nathalie Des Rosiers' article on the Quebec independence decision 14 and Professor Roberto Aponte Toro's comments on
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court case recognizing a persecuted political
minority's rights to freedom" outline a different approach-one that
has not always been followed either by the Canadian or by the Puerto
Rican Supreme Courts in political or other minority issues. This
different approach will not in itself provide a quick and easy solution
to deep-seated conflicts, as is evidenced by the debate surrounding the
Canadian Federal Government's decision to introduce what many
Qu~becers, including their provincial majority government, call a selfserving bill, one that purports to clarify the negotiation conditions set
out by the Reference re Secession of Quebec. 6 A sensible decision, however, does open the door to negotiating that which can only be solved
by negotiation. The fact that consensus is impossible to reach without
negotiation is illustrated by two centuries of majority/minority debate
amongst both English and French speaking Canadians and pro- and
anti-independence advocates in Puerto Rico. It is also evidenced by
the more or less lengthy and violent debates amongst English and
Irish, Spaniards and Basques, American Whites and Blacks, White
descendants of European settlers and Native Americans (be they from
the American Southwest, the Eastern Great Lakes, the James Bay
regions, or the Inuit Far North), and countless others who have facedoff but seldom sought common solutions with each other. To reach
common goals, one must be aware that social problems don't just go
away by ignoring the claims of others.
Quebec will not just float away to the Brittany or Normandy
coasts; the Canadian market will still be there if the province splits
from Ottawa. North American markets and defense considerations
are central to all parties who are now at odds, and all have an interest
in resolving these issues with a minimum of economic upheaval, political disarray, or actual bloodshed. Puerto Ricans will always want to
be different from Americans, while preserving an entry to a rich
United States market, resulting in an uneasy but necessary balance
14. See generally Des Rosiers, supra note 4.
15. See generally Aponte Toro, supra note 10.
16. Ref re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). As Professor Des Rosiers
points out, the Quebec Government answered with its own Act respecting the exercise of the
fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec State, Bill 99, on
December 15, 1999, only five days after the federal bill was presented. Des Rosiers, supra note 4,
at n.7.
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between cultural and financial needs. Puerto Rican independence
advocates are the living conscience of the cultural survival claims of
their people.
Protestants will continue to exist in Puerto Rico and will always
exert their right not to be subject to the ways the Catholic majority
considers acceptable. They will accept reasonable arguments, but will
react and demand respect when pushed, no matter what an insensitive
majority or an insensitive court says and does in nonbinding reference
cases such as the one issued by the Canadian Supreme Court in the
Quebec secession case, or in supposedly binding and ignored cases
such as the one issued by the Puerto Rican Supreme Court in Pentecostal Church.
Conflict is the flour from with which judicial bread is made. The
question is not whether we are to make it into dough or let it sit on the
shelf naively hoping it will disappear as if it were an unwanted volatile
ingredient; it is whether we are to end up eating hard, unleavened
loaves or sweet, almond filled croissants. Neither of the two will solve
all our nutritional needs, but some will make meals more palatable.

III. THE EXPANSION OF THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE PRINCIPLES

From a therapeutic jurisprudence point of view, there is another
question, however. The question is whether therapeutic jurisprudence
should be applied to these conflicts or if, by trying do so, it will lose its
specificity and dissolve into a larger medium, that of general alternate
resolution.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has traditionally been linked to criminal, juvenile, family, and domestic violence cases, and to the treatment
of mentally ill and drug dependent individuals.17 Professors Nathalie
Des Rosiers is and Bruce Winick, 19 for example, have suggested that
therapeutic jurisprudence be used in other cases, including appellate
ones. Professors David Finkelman and Thomas Grisso2 ° have rightly
linked it to the sociological jurisprudence and alternative dispute res-

17. David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudencein the Appellate Arena, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 217 (2000); David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Idea to
Application, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 587, 591 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); Bruce J. Winick, The Juris-

prudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, at 647.
18. See Nathalie Des Rosiers, The Mythical Power of Myth?: A Response to ProfessorDauer,
24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 307 (2000).

19. See Winick, supra note 17.
20. See Finkelman & Grisso, supranote 17.
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olutions movements. The question remains whether it is desirable to
do so.
In trying to make therapeutic jurisprudence an all-encompassing
movement, one runs the risk of turning a powerful solution into a
weak and easily discarded liquid. What has proved useful in cases
where the doctrine has been traditionally applied can become so
diluted when trying to use it in other cases that it becomes unrecognizable; it is then ignored not only in the other areas but also in areas
where it was gaining the reputation it deserved.
Dialogue, negotiation, mediation, and other dispute resolution
methods generally involve some degree of self study, constructive
criticism, empathy, and spiritual or moral healing. This inquiry is, at
times, helpful in treating the causes of disputes and antisocial behavior. It is also necessary to rebuild broken interpersonal ties.
To try to carry all interpersonal therapeutic and problem-solving
methods to other types of disputes may prove counterproductive,
however. Political disputes (and minority/majority disputes are often,
if not almost always, political, in the best sense of the word) must be
resolved on political grounds. This is not to say that dialogue, negotiation, and mediation are inappropriate, but rather that the nature of
such methods varies from the dialogue and intervention that serves
well in personal cases where therapeutic principles are clearly applicable. It is very different to deal with the mentally ill than to deal with
the politically oppressed. The victimized minority is, in the eyes of
the majority, the majority's victimizer in a cultural or religious confrontation, for both groups can invoke equally respected philosophic
and political arguments to sustain their demands. The demands of
one group, however, may well be incompatible with those of the other.
Comprehension will help solve political struggles, but the majority's acceptance of change is often preceded by political action and
therapeutic principles that can be seen as an effort to repress those
seeking change. By seeking to expand the therapeutic jurisprudence
movement into conflicts of this sort, the movement might find itself
deprived of the human resources and wide social support it needs to
further develop the tools it has developed so well and that serve the
needs of those it has focused on. The movement may also find that, if
its tools are not all suited for the new type of problem solving game it
has chosen to play, the movement itself will be discredited, with a
corresponding loss to all.
Listening, not telling, is often very useful, for when one later
speaks, one does so with both a full knowledge of what the now listeners are tuned to and a similar knowledge of how what one says can
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have the desired impact. This is not, however, exclusively related to
therapeutic ends. If one tries to claim it is, one risks seeing therapeutic
domain discarded as too general to be useful. Therapeutic jurisprudence should learn from the errors of the Law and Economics movement, which tried to change a tool still very useful in legal analysis and
policy determination into a sort of new religion, where a party's emotionally driven criminal actions were analyzed as if the, at times,
irrational man or woman would refrain from or continue in his or her
murderous pursuit of an unfaithful spouse solely on the basis of a
cold-blooded analysis of the pros and cons of cutting short the grievous party's life.

